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Abstract
The paper makes a case for there being causation in the form of causal properties or causal
structures in the domain of fundamental physics. That case is built in the first place on an
interpretation of quantum theory in terms of state reductions so that there really are both
entangled states and classical properties, GRW being the most elaborate physical proposal for
such an interpretation. I then argue that the interpretation that goes back to Everett can also be
read in a causal manner, the splitting of the world being conceivable as a causal process. Finally,
I mention that the way in which general relativity theory conceives the metrical field opens up
the way for a causal conception of the metrical properties as well.
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1. Introduction
Peter Mittelstaedt and I taught a course together at the University of Cologne in the winter
term 2001/02, that course being centred on philosophical theories of causation. He repeatedly
asked me what the physical foundations of causation were, and I was unable to answer that
question at the time. In this paper, I would like to sketch out the way in which I tend to
answer this question today (without expecting Peter Mittelstaedt to agree with that answer). I
endorse a realist view of causation, claiming that causation is a fundamental physical feature,
more precisely that the fundamental physical properties or structures are causal properties or
structures. This is a minority view, being opposed to the mainstream view rooted in
empiricism according to which causation is not a fundamental feature of the world.
The latter view has been forcefully set out by Bertrand Russell (1912) in a famous paper in
which he claims that a realist attitude to causation is not compatible with modern physics. In
the contemporary discussion, notably John Norton (2007a and b) has put forward such a view.
Of course, Russell, Norton and others are right in claiming that there is no question of an a
priori principle of causation to be imposed upon physics. A case for causation in physics can
only be made by considering the interpretation of the fundamental physical theories (see also
the discussion between Frisch 2009a, 2009b and Norton 2009). In this vein, I shall go into the
interpretation of quantum physics (section 2), explaining how the view of causation as a
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fundamental physical feature fits well into the interpretation of quantum physics in terms of
state reductions, GRW being the most prominent example of such an interpretation (section
3). Nonetheless, this view is also compatible with the Everett interpretation (section 4).
Finally, I will briefly mention the interpretation of general relativity (section 5) and in
conclusion sum up the arguments for taking causation to be anchored in physics (section 6).
2. The measurement problem in quantum physics
Quantum theory is one of the two fundamental physical theories, general relativity theory
being the other one. Notably the application of quantum theory to cosmology and the search
for a quantum theory of gravity, which sets out to unify quantum field theory and general
relativity theory, make clear that quantum theory is not a theory about measurement – that is,
not a theory about the behaviour of microphysical objects relative to measurement devices –,
but a candidate for a fundamental and universal theory of nature. The universal character of
quantum theory is pointed out by Peter Mittelstaedt (1998) in his by now classical book on
the interpretation of quantum mechanics and the measurement process. A fundamental theory
is one whose laws and explanations do not depend on any other theories, and a universal
theory is one whose laws apply to everything that there is in the world. Thus, for instance,
statistical mechanics is not a fundamental theory, since its laws and explanations depend on
laws and explanations that apply to single systems.
The upshot of these developments is that in today’s philosophy of science, it is clear that
quantum theory as such does not yield any reason to abandon scientific realism. Notably
following the debate about Bell’s theorem and the subsequent experiments, it is evident that
quantum theory forces us to change our vision of nature, that is, our Naturphilosophie, but
that as such it does not throw the presupposition that science tells us something about the
constitution of nature into question (for an assessment, see especially the papers in Cushing
and McMullin 1989 and Redhead 1995, in particular chapter 3).
Nonetheless, the standard textbook presentation of quantum mechanics still accords
measurement a prominent role, whereas, for instance, in the standard textbook presentation of
general relativity theory, no such stress is laid on measurement. The standard textbook
presentation of quantum mechanics, going back to von Neumann (1932, chapter VI), suggests
that when a measurement occurs, the dynamics of quantum systems as described by the
Schrödinger equation is no longer valid and one has to switch to another dynamics, which
simply consists in the postulate that when a measurement happens, the measured quantum
system adopts a definite numerical value of the measured property. The reason for this sudden
switch to another dynamics is that according to the Schrödinger dynamics, whenever one
system interacts with another system, and be it the interaction of a microscopic quantum
system with a macroscopic measurement device, the states of the two systems become
entangled. However, definite numerical values are observed as measurement outcomes, and a
measurement apparatus is in a state in which it indicates a definite numerical value if and only
if the measured quantum system is in a state in which it possesses a definite numerical value
of the measured property.
Although not unmotivated, von Neumann’s proposal is completely ad hoc. Measurement
processes and devices are not natural kinds, but scientists employ various physical systems as
measurement devices if they suit their interests. It is not possible to give a precise physical
definition of a measurement process and a measurement apparatus, since there is no physical
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difference that distinguishes a measurement process from other physical interactions.
Measurement devices are an invention of human beings that occurs late in cosmic evolution
and that presupposes the existence of macroscopic systems that are not subject to quantum
entanglement. Taking cosmology into account, it is evident that there have been processes of
the dissolution of quantum entanglement (state reductions) in cosmic evolution independently
of humans for humans to be able to use certain physical systems as measurement devices.
Such processes were the basis on which classical physical systems such as molecules,
organisms and finally humans developed. The measurement problem thus is not about
measurement in particular. It is a placeholder for the general problem how to understand the
transition from quantum systems in entangled states to systems that possess classical
properties. It is this problem that the thought experiment of Schrödinger’s cat highlights: one
can countenance atoms being in superposed and entangled states, but not cats.
This is a real problem for both physicists and philosophers concerned with the metaphysics
of science, since there is no established physical fact that one can cite as a solution to this
problem. This lack of an established physical fact also is the reason why the standard
textbook presentation of quantum mechanics still resorts to the unsatisfactory dualism of two
dynamics that goes back to von Neumann. There has of course been physical progress since
the days of von Neumann, but no definitive physical solution to the measurement problem.
Decoherence is such an established physical fact, but it changes nothing as regards quantum
entanglement: applied to measurement, the state of the quantum object and the measurement
apparatus still is an entangled one (an improper mixture, to use the term introduced by
d’Espagnat 1971, chapter 6.3), and not a product state (a proper mixture) (see e.g. Adler 2003
and Schlosshauer 2004). It is obvious why decoherence cannot dissolve entanglement, since
decoherence takes place entirely within the Schrödinger dynamics. Decoherence at most
shows why entanglement is not accessible to a local observer, but cannot provide for its
reduction.
3. GRW: the idea of a unified dynamics, and causation
This situation is the motivation for trying to do better than von Neumann did. There is
evidence that there is quantum entanglement, as highlighted by the Bell-type experiments,
and there is evidence that there are classical properties. The ontologically most conservative
solution to the measurement problem consists in searching for a unified dynamics that does
justice to both entanglement in the quantum domain and to classical properties when it comes
to macroscopic objects. Such a dynamics, however, can be achieved only by amending the
Schrödinger dynamics, more precisely by breaking its linearity.
The only elaborate physical proposal for a unified dynamics that accepts both the existence
of quantum entanglement and provides for the transition to classical properties is the one
going back to Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986) (GRW) (forerunners of this proposal
include notably Pearle 1976 and Gisin 1984). GRW add a stochastic term to the linear
Schrödinger equation such that for an isolated, non-massless microscopic quantum system
whose wave function (state vector) has a certain spatial spread that stochastic term indicates a
very low probability for spontaneous localization – that is, for a state reduction that ends up in
a spontaneous adoption of a rather definite position. It will on average take 1016 seconds for
such an isolated system to undergo a spontaneous localization. By contrast, when one
considers a macroscopic system that is composed of a large number of microscopic quantum
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systems, such a system will adopt a definite position in an extremely short time. Due to
entanglement, any spontaneous localization of one of the microscopic systems composing a
macroscopic system implies the spontaneous localization of all the others and thus of the
macroscopic system as a whole (see Ghirardi 2005, chapters 16.8 and 17, for an elaborate
presentation). It is of course not the task of a philosopher to assess the physical quality of the
proposal of GRW. I consider this proposal since it is hitherto the only elaborate physical
theory of a dynamics of state reductions.
The stochastic term that GRW add to the Schrödinger equation and that results in an
indeterministic dynamics is not a hidden variable. What GRW set out to do is to integrate von
Neumann’s state reduction postulate in the Schrödinger dynamics in order to achieve a
unified dynamics. The spontaneous localizations occur independently of measurement
processes. Measurement simply is one interaction among others that does not call for a special
treatment in the GRW version of quantum mechanics. GRW thereby is able to account for the
cosmic evolution that leads from quantum systems to classical systems and finally organisms,
including humans and their technological inventions. The gain thus is unification: provided
that one grants that both the quantum and the classical domain exist, GRW set out to tell us,
in contrast to von Neumann’s postulate, how both these domains hang together.
However, to be precise, the GRW amendment to the Schrödinger equation does not result
in a microscopic quantum system adopting exactly one definite numerical value of position
(apart from the mathematical fact that, in classical as well as in quantum mechanics, position
has a continuous spectrum of values so that its value can never be exactly one number). The
stochastic term that GRW add to the Schrödinger equation amounts to the wave function
being centred around a peak as a result of a spontaneous localization of the system. But that
peak is not a point, and, moreover, the wave function is not zero outside that peak. This fact is
known as the problem of the tails of Schrödinger’s cat (the tails problem for short).
According to the standard solution to this problem that goes back to Albert and Loewer
(1996), the requirement of there being precise numerical values (in other words, the
eigenstate-eigenvalue link) has to be abandoned. Thus, the price that we have to pay for this
solution – and hence for having a unified dynamics at our disposal – is that the notion of
microscopic localization becomes somewhat vague and that, in general, we have to
countenance values that are objectively there, but slightly vague or fuzzy. (The discussion on
the tails objection focused in recent years on the counting anomaly raised by P. Lewis 1997
and Clifton and Monton 1999; but the reply to that objection by Bassi and Ghirardi 1999 and
2001 seems to me to be entirely convincing; see also Wallace 2008, end of section 3).
Although the original proposal of GRW looks like an ontology of particles, quantum
systems being particles each of which has a certain probability of undergoing a process of
spontaneous localization, GRW are not committed to an ontology of particles. In contrast to
Bohm’s quantum theory, there is nothing like particles possessing always a definite position
and thus a definite trajectory in GRW. There are processes of spontaneous localization, but
these are processes of state reduction of superposed or entangled states, and quantum systems
in these latter states do not possess a definite localization and hence no definite trajectory.
Since there is interaction, the states that are to be considered as the basis for spontaneous
localizations are not superposed states of isolated quantum systems, but entangled states that
involve a lot of quantum systems.
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Quantum entanglement is the main motivation for a position that is known as ontic
structural realism and that is one of the main currents in contemporary metaphysics of
science, going beyond an ontology of particles (see notably Ladyman 1998, French and
Ladyman 2003, Esfeld 2004). A physical structure can be conceived as a network of concrete
physical relations – such as the relations of quantum entanglement – among objects that are
nothing but what stands in these relations. There is no need for structural realism to claim that
there are no objects at all and thus no need to change standard first order logic, which
quantifies over objects (see the so-called moderate structural realism of Esfeld and Lam 2008
in contrast to French and Ladyman 2003; but see also the more moderate formulations in
Ladyman and Ross 2007, chapters 2 to 5). The point is that these objects do not possess any
identity independently of the relations in which they stand. There hence are no intrinsic
properties on which these relations could supervene, and the objects cannot be individual
particles.
Let us assume that ontic structural realism is a metaphysical framework that fits quantum
entanglement, pointing out the appropriate way in which quantum entanglement goes beyond
an ontology of particles. GRW have the means to take quantum entanglement, thus
conceived, into account. Nothing hinders one to conceptually develop GRW in such a way
that the disposition for spontaneous localization is regarded as being inherent to the entangled
state as such, instead of being an intrinsic property of individual quantum particles. In other
words, the probability for an entangled state to undergo a state reduction in the form of the
spontaneous localization of the objects that stand in the relations of entanglement in question
depends on the number of objects that the entangled state includes. The result of this
interpretative move is exactly what GRW claim, namely that a macroscopic system consisting
of a great number of quantum systems that are entangled with each other adopts a rather
precise position in physical space in the form of a spontaneous localization of these quantum
systems in an extremely short time, whereas in the case of there being only a few quantum
systems that are entangled with each other, the probability for the whole system to adopt a
precise position in physical space is very low. Hence, in developing the ontology of GRW,
one can waive a commitment to quantum systems being individual particles.
That move paves the way for extending GRW to quantum field theory, including quantum
gravity, as well. There are of course non-local correlations in GRW, including correlations
between space-like separated events of spontaneous localization, but there is no non-local
interaction. GRW violate the condition of outcome independence in the derivation of the Bell
inequalities, but not the condition of parameter independence. (Mittelstaedt 2000 takes GRW
to explain these non-local correlations in terms of the process resulting in spontaneous
localization being their common cause).
Furthermore, following Bell (1987), one can conceive GRW in such a way that the
reduction of entangled states results in flashes centred around space-time points. Thus
conceived, GRW are not committed to there being a globally privileged reference frame or
coordinate system, as has been shown by Tumulka (2006) (see also Maudlin 2008 for a
discussion). The flash version of GRW hence is compatible with special as well as general
relativity. It can be set out in such a manner that, for instance, the question of the temporal
order of the two measurements in a Bell-type experiment on a pair of spin 1/2 systems in the
singlet state separated by a space-like interval has no significance at all. Although the work of
Tumulka (2006) is only a first step, there is thus reason to hope that it will eventually turn out
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to be possible to develop an interpretation of quantum theory that acknowledges processes of
state reduction existing in nature without having to maintain that there is a globally privileged
reference frame or coordinate system, imposing an objective temporal order on space-like
separated events.
Taking state reductions seriously, as do GRW, has important ontological consequences, and
it is here that causation comes in. According to GRW, definite numerical values of state-
dependent properties exist, but only as a result of the dissolution of entanglement, that is, as a
result of state reductions in the form of spontaneous localizations. The state reductions lead to
one definite numerical value existing at the exclusion of the other possible definite numerical
values. An entangled state therefore is best conceived as the disposition to bring about
definite numerical values of state-dependent properties through state-reduction – in other
words, the disposition for spontaneous localization. That disposition is itself a real and actual
property, not a mere potency.
Treating entanglement as a disposition that is a real and actual property fits into what is
known as the causal theory of properties (see notably Shoemaker 1980 and Bird 2007).
According to this theory, insofar as properties are certain qualities, they are powers to bring
about certain effects. Thus, insofar as entangled states are certain real and actual, qualitative
physical states, they are the power to bring about definite numerical values through
spontaneous localization – or, in short, the power to produce spontaneous localizations. In
contrast to macroscopic dispositions such as the disposition of water to dissolve sugar, the
power that entangled quantum states are does not depend on outside triggering conditions for
its manifestation. That is the point of the disposition being one for spontaneous localization.
There is no need for causal properties to be intrinsic properties of individual particles.
Nothing hinders one to apply the causal theory of properties to physical structures such as the
structures of entanglement: insofar as entanglement is a network of concrete physical
relations, that network is the power to bring about spontaneous localizations such that there
are definite numerical values that are correlated in a specific manner (see Esfeld 2009 for
details). Hence, as regards entanglement, there are only possible definite numerical values
each of which can become actual at the exclusion of the other ones. However, this is not a
mere potency, but a really existing power to bring about such values (for more details about
quantum dispositions in GRW and the arguments in the following four paragraphs, see Dorato
and Esfeld forthcoming).
Introducing dispositions and thus causation in this manner in the interpretation of quantum
physics yields a clear answer to the question what the properties of quantum objects are if
there are no properties with definite numerical values. Suggesting that there are no properties
at all if there are no definite numerical values does not make sense, since a physical system
cannot exist without possessing physical properties, and properties with definite numerical
values cannot develop out of nothing. And saying that there simply is the wave function or
state vector begs the question, since the wave function or state vector is a mathematical tool to
represent physical reality, but not itself physical reality. In other words, one has to spell out an
account of what the physical reality as represented by the wave function or state vector is.
Conceiving the ontology of GRW in terms of dispositions provides for such an account: the
properties that there are in entangled states when there are no definite values are dispositions
to develop such values, and the causal theory of properties makes clear how such dispositions
can be real and actual properties.
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Conceiving entangled states as dispositions in the form of causal powers implies a further
commitment: taking probabilities into account, we have to say that the powers that the
entangled states are amount to propensities, that is, dispositions that have a certain
quantifiable strength for spontaneous manifestation in a certain manner, that is, producing a
certain numerical value at the exclusion of other values. That strength is expressed in the form
of probabilities. In other words, in this framework, we are committed to applying the
propensity theory of probabilities to the quantum probabilities. The advantage of doing so is
that we get the account of probabilities that is needed for the quantum probabilities, namely
objective single case probabilities. Quantum probabilities clearly apply to single cases, and
they are objective probabilities, concerning features of the quantum domain itself, instead of
our knowledge. The propensity view of probabilities meets these demands, since it takes
probabilities to be anchored in dispositions that have a certain quantifiable strength to
manifest themselves spontaneously in a certain manner.
Frigg and Hoefer (2007), by contrast, regard the GRW probabilities as fitting into a
Humean theory of probabilities as well. However, a Humean theory of probabilities, such as
the one of David Lewis (1994), has to resort to the parameters of simplicity and strength and
the best balance between them. But these are epistemic parameters. It is therefore doubtful
whether such a theory can really yield objective, single case probabilities. Mittelstaedt (1997,
in particular pp. 168-170) does not countenance the propensity interpretation of quantum
probabilities either, although he endorses an individualistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics by contrast to an ensemble interpretation. However, in this case, it seems logical to
apply probabilities to single cases as well, and the only clear way of doing so is by conceiving
them as propensities. The propensity interpretation of quantum probabilities has been refined
considerably since it had first been introduced notably by Popper (1959) (see in particular the
papers of Suárez 2004a, 2004b and 2007 as well as Dorato 2007).
Finally, there is a further feature that an interpretation of quantum theory that
acknowledges state reductions has to include and that becomes intelligible in the framework
of the causal theory of properties. Amending the Schrödinger equation with a stochastic term
as GRW do in order to account for state reductions has not only the consequence that the
dynamics is indeterministic, but also that it is not time-reversal invariant. In other words, the
GRW equation is a candidate for a fundamental law of nature that is not time-reversal
invariant. Quantum systems that have undergone a spontaneous localization may of course
again enter into entangled states, but conceiving a process that runs from a spontaneous
localization back to the entangled state that existed before that localization would contradict
the GRW law, more precisely the stochastic term that GRW add to the Schrödinger equation.
Again, that feature of GRW has an important advantage: it provides for an explanation of the
direction of time. As Albert (2000, chapter 7) has shown, the GRW processes of spontaneous
localization are not only irreversible, thus singling out a direction of time, but they can also
serve as the origin of all time-asymmetric phenomena. Conceiving entangled states in terms
of dispositions (causal powers) leads to an explanation of this lack of time-reversal
invariance: the production of an effect by a cause is the paradigmatic example of an
irreversible process. Consequently, if spontaneous localization is the manifestation of a
disposition, it is evident why processes of state reduction can in principle not be reversed and
why they are the foundation of the direction of time. In other words, if causation is a feature
of the domain of fundamental physics, there being causal properties in that domain, then the
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dynamics describing that domain cannot be time-reversal invariant, since the production of an
effect by a cause is not a time-reversal invariant process.
To sum up, there are arguments that are independent of the issue of causation in
fundamental physics and that speak in favour of searching for a unified dynamics in the
interpretation of quantum physics, as do GRW. The main argument is that in doing so, one
does justice to both the existence of entanglement in the quantum domain and to the existence
of classical properties when it comes to macroscopic objects. Within the framework of a
unified dynamics, nothing hinders one from maintaining that quantum theory provides for a
complete description of the quantum domain – in other words, the wave function (state
vector) is such a complete description, and there is no need to supplement this description
with the assumption of so-called hidden variables (as is done in Bohm’s theory of the
quantum domain, which in addition to the description by the wave function assumes that
quantum systems are individual particles, possessing always a definite numerical value of
position and thus a definite trajectory in space-time). Furthermore, in acknowledging the real
existence of classical properties, there then is no reason to commit oneself to an inflationary
ontology of the world splitting itself up in infinitely many branches of the universe as a result
of measurements (or simply as a result of decoherence), since no state reductions are admitted
(as according to the interpretation going back to Everett 1957). Having thus based an
interpretation of quantum physics in terms of a unified dynamics on arguments that are
independent of the issue of causation in physics, the ontological commitments of that
interpretation then lead us, as spelled out in this section, to acknowledging causation in the
form of dispositions and thus causal properties as a fundamental physical feature.
4. The Everett interpretation and causation
Although the interpretation of quantum physics that admits state reductions is the locus
classicus for anchoring dispositions and thus causation in the domain of fundamental physics,
making a case for causation in quantum physics is not necessarily tied to an interpretation of
quantum physics in terms of entangled states being dispositions for developing into classical
properties. Causation can be situated within the other two main contenders in the
interpretation of quantum physics as well. As regards Bohm’s theory, it seems possible to
propose a causal reading of the quantum potential, it being a causal structure that moves the
particles around. Let us, however, consider the Everett interpretation rather than Bohm’s
interpretation in a little more detail, since it enables us to further pursue the issue of causation
in fundamental physics.
The Everett interpretation takes the Schrödinger dynamics to be the complete dynamics of
quantum systems. It does not recognize state reductions, and it does hence not recognize the
real existence of classical properties. One is in this case committed to regarding the quantum
structures of entanglement as being universal: they encompass all the objects in the world and
all their dynamical properties, including all the macroscopic objects and in the last resort also
the consciousness of observers (the last consequence has first been highlighted by Albert and
Loewer 1988 and Lockwood 1989, chapters 12 and 13, in the so called many minds
interpretation of quantum theory). According to the way in which this interpretation is usually
set out, the world splits into infinitely many branches that exist in parallel so that all the
objects in the world including the consciousness of each observer are infinitely many times
duplicated, existing in infinitely many branches of the universe, and having one of the
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possible dynamical values of their properties in each of these branches. In other words, all the
possible definite numerical values of a property that enter into the superpositions and
entanglement do in fact exist, but distributed among infinitely many branches of the universe.
The observation of classical properties is usually accounted for in this framework in the
following manner: the structures of entanglement develop into a process that is known as
decoherence. Decoherence is a process leading in a very short time to the different terms of an
entangled state no longer interfering with each other. A local observer who stands within such
a structure of entanglement therefore has in her observations no access to the other terms of
the superposition, which exist in other branches of the universe. In a nutshell, the world
appears classically to us, because, being local observers, we cannot observe the structures of
entanglement as a whole (which nevertheless really exist) (see Wallace 2008, section 4, for a
detailed assessment of the contemporary discussion about the interpretation of quantum
theory that goes back to Everett).
It is in this interpretative framework also possible to consider the quantum structures of
entanglement as causal structures. This interpretation has to answer the following question:
What does the physical reality of the quantum structures of entanglement consist in, so that
these structures can develop through decoherence into a splitting of the world in infinitely
many branches, which do not interfere with each other and which contain definite numerical
values of quantum properties each? A clear answer to this question that recognizes the
physical reality of the structures of quantum entanglement without confusing that physical
reality with the mathematical reality of the state vector (wave function) consists in saying the
following: the quantum structures of entanglement are causal structures, being the power or
disposition to produce through decoherence infinitely many branches of the universe, which
do not interfere with one another. On this reading, decoherence is a causal process, consisting
in the manifestation of causal structures in the form of the structures of entanglement. In order
to vindicate this reading, one would have, however, to show how decoherence can be
conceived as an irreversible process, although decoherence is situated entirely within the
Schrödinger dynamics.
Let us pursue the crucial point one step further: one cannot content oneself with the claim
that one should take the quantum wave function (state vector) seriously, although that claim is
of course well taken. The quantum state vector is a mathematical structure, living in
configuration space and representing physical reality, but it is not itself physical reality. In an
interpretation of a physical theory, one therefore has to answer the question what the physical
reality as represented by a mathematical structure (such as the wave function or state vector in
configuration space) amounts to. The answer to this question cannot consist in saying that
what is physically real is defined by its position in fourdimensional space-time, since
entangled states do not possess a definite localization and are independent of spatio-temporal
distances. One obtains a forceful answer to this question by employing a causal criterion of
reality: real physical structures distinguish themselves from mathematical structures in that
they are causally efficacious. In other words, something is a candidate for a real physical
entity in contrast to a mere mathematical one if and only if it can be conceived as being a
causal power, that is, as being a disposition to produce certain effects. That criterion applies
to the interpretation of quantum physics independently of whether or not one recognizes state
reductions.
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Since quantum entanglement is independent of spatio-temporal distance, the structures of
entanglement can be regarded as being more fundamental than the metrical structures of
classical space-time. Indeed, important research in quantum gravity takes the direction of
treating classical space-time as not being fundamental (see e.g. Kiefer 2004, notably chapter
10). But what then is fundamental and how does what is physically fundamental distinguish
itself from a mere mathematical entity? Again, one can represent the quantum reality in an
abstract and general manner in terms of algebraic structures (see notably the algebraic
representation of quantum field theory, in particular Haag 1992). But algebraic structures are
a tool to represent physical reality so that one still has to answer the question of what that
physical reality thus represented consists in and how real physical structures distinguish
themselves from their representation in terms of mathematical structures. In early modern
philosophy of nature, Leibniz objects to Descartes that the notion of spatio-temporal
extension is not fundamental and that instead the causal notion of force is more fundamental.
Leibniz hence defends a causal conception of matter. That conception still is the only
alternative available to the definition of physical reality in terms of localization in space-time.
The question of what the fundamental reality as represented by mathematical structures
consists in hence leads to a general and powerful argument for taking causation in the form of
causal structures to be a fundamental physical feature.
5. Space-time and causation
Let us briefly consider space-time itself as treated by general relativity theory. In classical
physics up to and including special relativity, space-time is conceived as a passive
background structure in which material objects and their properties are embedded. However,
general relativity theory abandons this conception of space-time. According to general
relativity theory, the metrical field contains itself energy, namely the gravitational energy.
Hence, general relativity theory excludes a dualism between space-time as a passive
background arena and matter as that what is inserted into this arena. Space-time, as
constituted by the metrical field, is itself a dynamical entity and interacts with non-
gravitational energy-matter as well as with itself.
Since the metrical field contains the gravitational energy, it can be conceived as a material
entity on a par with all the other physical fields. In this vein, one can regard gravitation as a
fundamental physical interaction on a par with the other fundamental physical interactions –
the fact that gravitation is universal and includes all physical objects notwithstanding (see in
particular Rovelli 2007, section 4). On this view, in short, the fact that space-time is no
passive background structure in general relativity signifies that the spatio-temporal,
gravitational structures are material structures as well. On this basis, it is therefore possible to
conceive the spatio-temporal, gravitational relations as a causal structure as well: the metrical
structures are the power or disposition to produce the gravitational effects (see Bartels 1996,
pp. 37-38, Bartels 2009 and Bird 2009, section 2.3; see Livanios 2008 against this position –
however, simply pointing out the fact that the metrical structures are geometrical structures
begs the question, since they contain the gravitational energy).
One may envisage going even one step further: the programme known as causal set theory
provides for a precise mathematical model of how causal processes can build up space-time
itself (see in particular Sorkin 1991 and Reid 2001). One can receive this programme as
taking up Leibniz’ characterization of matter in terms of points of force and employing this
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characterization in order to understand space-time itself: according to causal set theory, causal
elements locally produce further causal elements, and these processes taken together
constitute space-time (see Butterfield 2007, pp. 858-861, and Earman 2008, sections 7 and 8,
for a philosophical assessment). However, the view of the metrical structures of space-time
being causal structures is not committed to the programme of causal set theory.
6. Conclusion
In sum, we can say the following: nothing hinders one to conceive the fundamental physical
structures as causal structures. By contrast to what the tradition going back to Russell (1912)
claims, it is not only possible to interpret today’s fundamental physical theories in a causal
manner, but there are a number of arguments for doing so: general philosophical arguments
from the metaphysics of properties (see e.g. Shoemaker 1980 and Bird 2007), the requirement
to be able to distinguish real physical from mere mathematical structures, and several
concrete arguments in the interpretation of quantum theory and the interpretation of general
relativity theory.
These arguments drive us to an anti-empiricist ontology that rehabilitates the notions of
causation and causal properties in the domain of fundamental physics: we have to
countenance irreducible dispositions and consequently causal properties in the fundamental
physical realm, and at least if we do so in the framework of an interpretation of quantum
theory that admits state reductions, we are thereby also committed to objective, single case
probabilities in the form of propensities, and we get a fundamental law that is time-reversal
invariant, thus designating a direction of time. There is as such nothing wrong with these
commitments. The tradition of dogmatic empiricism in the philosophy of science has been
overcome since the 1960s, and there are sound arguments available for each of these
ontological commitments, as indicated in this paper. These commitments bring fundamental
science closer to the special sciences such as biology as well as to common sense – at least in
the sense that the special sciences and common sense trade in dispositions, adopting a realist
attitude towards causation, and that the phenomena they consider are nearly all not time-
reversal invariant. But again, this is a welcome result, since fundamental science, the special
sciences and common sense are all about one and the same world. Note that the relative
closeness to the special sciences and to common sense is a result, and not a starting point or
an argument for the claims defended in this paper.
The renewed interest in metaphysics in contemporary philosophy started with descriptive
metaphysics in the late 1950s (see e.g. Strawson 1959), which limited itself to describing the
ontological commitments of common sense, refusing to engage in the project of revising these
commitments. Today, a current known as metaphysics of science belongs to the mainstream
in philosophy of science, seeking to build a vision of nature on the basis of our best scientific
theories, thereby linking up with the German tradition of Naturphilosophie. Metaphysics of
science clearly engages in a revision of the ontological commitments of common sense on the
basis of science. But it would certainly not be wrong-headed if this current could link up with
descriptive metaphysics in retaining some of its central commitments – such as the one to
dispositions and causation –, insofar as there are independent arguments available for these
commitments based on science.
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